譯文（字數 8868）：

挪威石油化工業中的安全、保險和經濟激勵制度

Petter Osmundsen，Terje Aven，Jan Erik Vinnem

斯塔萬格大學 產業經濟學和風險管理部，挪威 斯塔萬格

2005年3月1日收到，2006年3月16日收到修改稿，2006年11月13日接收2007年1月17日在線

摘   要

目前在石油行業中，關鍵績效指標和激勵機制越來越多地使用。根據現代激勵理論，我們探索這種管理趨勢對預防傷害、重大事故和安全生產有什么影響。經濟激勵制度可以用來預防事故？明顯是不可能的。安全工作的挑戰是什么？特別是安全工作在產品和收益率等經濟誘因作用下會受到怎樣的影響？安全可以被忽視嗎？補救措施有哪些？

關鍵詞：安全；經濟激勵；關鍵績效指標

第一章  簡介

重大事故造成的損失誰承擔？重點從激勵理論的角度來看。因為經濟激勵制度就是用來防止事故的發生。上帝是公平的，并且從狹義的經濟學中可以看出能從經濟激勵中得到更多的補償的公司能更好的預防事故。但其實公司更傾向于避免這類可能會有很高的損害賠償的低頻事件。他們通常采取兩種方式：⑴努力降低事故風險；⑵購入保險。后者降低了破產的概率，但必須獲得足夠的資金。但我們應該注意的是保險抑制了經濟激勵效果，因為它減少了事故帶來的經濟補償。我們需要尋求預防事故（傷害和事故預防）的經濟激勵制度和分散風險的保險合同的平衡點。石油行業只是作為一個典型案例。我們的目的是運用現代激勵理論來解決安全問題。

外文原文（字符數 29843）：

Safety, economic incentives and insurance in the Norwegian petroleum industry

Petter Osmundsen, Terje Aven, Jan Erik Vinnem

Department of Industrial Economics and Risk Management, University of Stavanger, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway

Received 1 March 2005; received in revised form 16 March 2006; accepted 13 November 2006

Available online 17 January 2007

Abstract

There is an increased use of key performance indicators and incentive schemes in the petroleum industry. Applying modern incentive theory, we explore what implications this management trend has for injury and major accident prevention efforts and safety. Can economic incentives be designed for accident prevention activities? In cases where this is not possible, what are the challenges for the safety efforts? In particular, how are safety efforts affected by enhanced economic incentives for other performance dimensions like production and rate of return? Can safety be neglected? What remedies are available?

Keywords: Safety; Economic incentives; Key performance indicators

1. Introduction

Who bears the costs of a major accident? From the perspective of incentive theory this is a vital question, as it determines the economic incentives to prevent such accidents. All things equal, and in a narrow economic sense, the incentives for a company to prevent accidents are higher if higher fraction of the damages borne by the company. But companies generally prefer to avoid this type of low-frequency events that potentially may have high damages. They typically respond to this in two ways: (1) exerting efforts to reduce accident risk, and (2) taking out insurance. The latter is to reduce the probability of bankruptcy, and is often a requirement to obtain financing. It is worth noting, in our context, that insurance reverses the economic incentive effect, as it alleviates the economic consequences of accidents. We explore the trade-off between incentives for accident prevention (injury or major accident prevention) and the risk-spreading of insurance contracts. The oil industry is used as an illustrative case.